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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PAUL L. NELSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9287 
Respondent agrees with appellant's statement of 
facts as far as it goes. although it appears unduly de-
tailed and to contain a great amount of irrelevant mat-
ter. However, there is considerable other evidence that 
should come to the attention of the Court in order 
that it not be afforded only an incomplete and slanted 
picture of the case, one highly favorable to appellant. 
Respondent deems it more orderly procedure to 
set out the necessary additional facts in the course of 
its argument rather than in a separate statement of 
facts at this point. This will avoid repetition and un-
necessary imposition upon the time of the Court. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFEN-
D AN T ' S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
NO.8. 
POINT II. 
NO ERROR OCCURRED IN THE JUDGE'S 
CHARGE TO THE JURY TO DISREGARD 
THE TESTIMONY OF THE S T ATE 
CHEMIST. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION IN N 0 
WAY VIOLATED EITHER THE UNITED 
STATES OR STATE CONSTITUTION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFEN-
D A N T . S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
NO.8. 
It is true that the instruction requested by appel-
lant has at times been given in U tab cases. 
As appellant says, it was used in State v. Burch~ 
100 Utah 414, 115 P. 2d 911. That case, however, 
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differed radical! y from the one at hand in that all of 
the evidence there was circumstantial. Proof of this 
is the statement of the court at page 9 12 : 
''The present case is out of the ordinary in 
that there is not one ultimate fact necessary for 
a conviction that is substantiated by direct evi-
dence. * * *" 
In this case, on the other hand, there is abundant direct 
evidence that defendant did considerable drinking prior 
to the accident, and this, coupled with the circumstan-
tial evidence present, certain! y was sufficient to prove 
his drunken condition. 
Appellant relies heavily on the case of Utah Farm 
Bureau Insurance Company v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 
315 P. 2d 2 7 7. He takes from the con text thereof this 
statement: "The fact that there was an empty bottle 
in the car and the smell of liquor are not sufficient to 
support a finding of intoxication" in an effort to sup-
port his theory about circumstantial evidence and the 
necessity of giving the requested instruction. 
There was, of course, much evidence in this case 
additional to the smell of alcohol. A careful reading of 
the facts of the Chugg case shows it is not in point and 
cannot serve as much help in deciding this one. There 
the defendant had been rendered unconscious by the 
accident and was in pronounced shock. Here defen-
dant was not knocked unconscious and, as he points 
out in his brief at page 15, was not hurt in the crash. 
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In the C hugg case the officer testified, ''From the 
smell, I imagine he had been drinking quite a bit.'' 
(Italics ours.) The court observed that the officer had 
seen defendant for only about a minute altogether, and 
did not see him walk at all. In making a point of this, 
the court seems to have opened the door in this case to 
testimony of the appearance of defendant's walk as 
being proper evidence as to intoxication. 
The apparent doctrine in the quotation appel-
lant takes from the Burch decision (A. B. 17), if in 
fact it really meant what appellant contends, seems to 
have been watered down somewhat in later decisions. 
And, incidentally, the facts of the Burch case constitute 
just about as poor a case for the prosecution as can be 
imagined. 
In the two cases cited by appellant himself, the 
court seems to limit the obligation of giving the in-
struction desired by appellant to a circumstance involv-
ing no direct evidence, as shown in the following state-
ment: "where the proof of a necessary fact is depen-
dent solely upon circumstantial evidence, such circum-
stances must be such as to exclude every reasonable hy-
pothesis other than the existence of such fact and be 
inconsistent with its existence and inconsistent with its 
nonexistence.'' (Emphasis ours.) State V. Erwin, 101 
Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285 at p. 302. and State v. An-
derson, 66 Utah 573, 158 P. 2d 127, at page 130. 
The use of the term "solely" is important in this 
case because here. as previously stated, there was con-
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siderable other evidence, direct evidence, indicating the 
fact of intoxication, and its existence did not rest upon 
circumstantial evidence alone. 
The short concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe 
in the Burch case is enlightening and _useful. There he 
states: 
··I concur in the result. I do so in the be-
lief that there was no substantial evidence to 
show the defendant's participation in the alleged 
offense to warrant the submission of the matter 
to the jury. However, I do not agree in the 
views indicating that circumstantial evidence is 
to be considered by a jury in a different and 
more restricted light than is direct evidence. 
There are cases where the set of circumstances 
may be stronger than much direct evidence which 
could be adduced. In the dovetailing of circum-
stantial evidence criminal prosecutions may oft-
times be made equally as strong and convincing 
as in the use of direct evidence. Juries and trial 
courts should not be required to view it as 
weaker evidence which must 'exclude the hy-
pothesis of innocence.' We should rest content 
with a rule that if a jury has no reasonable 
doubts about the guilt of a man, taking into 
consideration all competent evidence, it may 
convict, without including in opinions expres-
sions which may be seized upon to confuse and 
confound the ordinary jury whose task is at 
best a difficult one.'' 
In the Anderson case, Justice Wolfe again con-
curs with the result, but discusses the question of rea-
sonable hypothesis as follows: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
"I concur but I call attention to the in-
clusion in the opinion of the quotation from 
State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285, 
302. I think the first and last sentence of that 
quotation helpful. The middle part of the quo-
tation stating that the 'circumstances must be 
such as to reasonably exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis other than the existence of such fact 
and be consistent with its existence and incon-
sistent with its non-existence' is too abstruse for 
the ordinary jury, and from my experience has 
even misled judges to withhold from the jury 
cases which should properly have been sub-
mitted. I paid my respect to this sort of a test 
in my concurring opinion in the case of State v. 
Burch~ 100 Utah 414, 115 P. 2d 911, at page 
913. 
"My objection is not that the test, prop-
er 1 y understood and used, is not a valid one. ln 
certain cases where the circumstances as to each 
necessary element of the crime are not of them-
selves anywhere near compelling as to such ele-
ment, but when taken with those other transac-
tions which give color or lend interpretation and 
also interlock and reinforce other groups of cir-
cumstances relating to other transactions in the 
history of the events which it is alleged consti-
tute a critne, so that from the w l1ole a definite 
conclusion of guilt may or may not be drawn, 
it may be wise to instruct the jurymen in such 
fashion as to cause them to parade before their 
minds all possibly reasonable hypotheses con-
sistent with innocence as a method of delibera-
tion. Such a case was State v. Laub, 102 Utah 
402, 131 P. 2d 805. But even under the facts 
of that case I believe that less confusion would 
arise frotn the giving of an instruction that if 
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from all the circumstances the jury had no rea-
sonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendants, 
they could find them guilty; that if all the cir-
cumstances pointed concurringly to the guilt of 
the defendants so as to remove all doubts 
founded on reason, they would be justified in 
finding the defendants guilty. 
"The main objection to the test that the 
evidence must exclude every reasonable hy-
pothesis lies in the phrase 'reasonable hypoth-
eses.' It invites the jurymen and indeed judges 
(see State v. Bruno, 97 Utah 17, 85 P. 2d 
79 5), to conjure up in their imaginations every 
sort of hypothesis which may be fitted into the 
evidence and then in the process of discarding 
some and retaining others the test of reason-
ableness is applied with great variation as to 
their judgment as to what is reasonable. Often 
in determining whether a particular explana-
tion is or is not reasonable, judges in vade the 
province of the jury and I fear that the method 
of taking up all possible hypotheses which the 
evidence permits and then sifting out the reason-
able from the unreasonable, those terms depend-
ing of course on the judgment of the judges, 
leads to such invasion. 
"It is odd how some abstract statement 
applicable when first devised as a test on the 
facts then in evidence persists down through 
the years to become an incubus on the law. 
There is no use of inflicting on a judge and 
much less on a jury a test which says that where 
a fact rests on circumstantial evidence alone the 
'circumstances must be such as to reasonbly ex-
clude [''in every reasonable mind" should I 
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suppose be supplied] every reasonable hypoth-
esis other than the existence of such fact,' etc. 
" .. fhe simple test is: 'Under all the evi-
dence in this case can I as a judge say that no 
normal functioning mind applying its reason-
ing faculties to the evidence in the case could 
conclude that the defendant was guilty.' If so 
it must be withdrawn from the jury. If the 
judge has doubt as to that it should go to the 
jury with the instruction that it, the jury, must 
be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as to 
defendant's guilt before it should find him 
guilty. These are comparatively simple tests-
albeit they do depend on the experience and ca-
pacity of the minds of the fact finders, a human 
element of uncertainty we cannot escape from. 
There are no absolutes in the human mind. We 
have no robots into which we can feed evidence, 
and turn a crank and get the exact, correct and 
perfect result. All that can be expected is human 
justice-that which emerges from not infallible 
and imperfect human beings even after every at-
tempt to be fair and apply to the utmost their 
comparatively frail and limited human facul-
. , , 
t1es. 
In State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131 P. 2d 805, 
the court made this statement: 
"While the State's evidence is circumstan-
tial, such evidence may be just as conclusive or 
even more so than direct evidence, but the prose-
cution still has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. 
* * *" 
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At T. 87 Warren Haddenham, an ambulance 
driver, referred to a conversation involving defendant 
and Trooper Schmidt in which defendant said he had 
drunk two or three schooners of beer and two vodkas 
and a whiskey. On the following page, under cross 
examination, Haddenham said that defendant had 
mentioned he had gone to a bar for drinks prior to the 
accident. 
At T. 106 Deputy Marshall Gwynn testified 
that defendant, in answer to Trooper Schmidt's ques-
tion, said he had gone to the Ashtonian beer parlor for 
three schooners of beer, and that he also had a couple 
of drinks of whiskey and a drink of vodka at another 
place. At T. 109 under cross examination, Gwynn 
said the Justice of the Peace had asked defendant how 
much he had drunk, and that defendant said he had 
several drinks-four or five drinks. 
At T. 135, North Salt Lake Town Marshall, 
Royal A. Reynolds, testified: 
"He wasn't sure; it varied anywhere from 
two to four or five schooners of beer, two shots 
of vodka, and some whiskey. He wasn't def-
initely sure on how much whiskey." 
At T. 180 Justice of the Peace E. S. Arbuckle 
said he had talked with defendant and asked him if 
he had been drinking, and that defendant said yes. 
''* * * and I asked him how much, and he said 
two beers, a vodka and some whiskey." After some 
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further conversation Arbuckle then testified he again 
asked defendant "How many did you say you had? 
And he said 'I had about four beers and two or three 
vodkas', that time." 
At T. 219 defendant himself testified to having 
drunk three beers at a tavern and at T. 220~ said he 
drank some vodka later at the home of a friend. 
In circumstances such as existed in the Burch case 
where there was no direct evidence and the State's 
case had to ride or fall on circumstantial evidence alone, 
the instruction requested might be appropriate. How-
ever, such is not the situation here because of the abun-
dance of direct evidence. 
If the court were to adopt defendant's theory that 
whenever the evidence indicates a ''reasonable hypoth-
esis'' of innocence, the case should not be allowed to 
go to the jury at all (A. B. 17), normal criminal prac-
tice would indeed be stifled and perhaps eventually 
destroyed. Any defendant could be expected to con-
jure up evidence of such nature as to constitute a prima 
facie "reasonable hypothesis" of innocence and the 
State's case vvould automatically dissolve. This should 
not be the law in Utah. 
In addition, a defendant in a civil case is not en-
titled as a matter of right to have instructions given 
in his own words where the applicable law is set forth 
in substance otherwise. The proper law, as applied 
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to the facts of this case, was adequately covered by the 
instructions actually given by the Court, and particu-
larly by Nos. 2, 5, 11, 15 and 17. Thus, the Court 
committed no error. Even if it should be held that 
error did occur, however, it could not be considered 
prejudicial under all the circumstances, since the jury 
was fully apprised that each and every allegation had 
to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. 
POINT II. 
NO ERROR OCCURRED IN THE JUDGE'S 
CHARGE TO THE JURY TO DISREGARD 
THE TESTIMONY OF THE S T A T E 
CHEMIST. 
Admittedly the State Chemist did not attempt 
to tell the Court what effect certain amounts of alcohol 
in various body fluids would have upon the conduct 
of an individual, nor did the State produce medical 
testimony to this effect. On the basis of this, the Court 
gave Instruction No. 9 (R. 29), reproduced at page 
21 of appellant's brief. The instruction is identical 
vvith appellant's requested Instruction No. 4 (R. 17). 
It reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that, though there is 
evidence regarding the results of a chemical test 
of the defendant's bodily fluids, to wit, urine, 
if there is no evidence of the effect of that per-
centage or any other percentage of alcohol in the 
blood by weight upon the human being, you 
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must disregard the results of the chemical test 
which has been received in evidence." 
Respondent believes that this instruction fully 
protects appellant's rights and that it precludes the 
occurrence of any error that might otherwise have 
arisen in the jury's considering the State Chemist's tes-
timony as to the results of his examination of appel-
lant's urine. 
If there is any weakness at all in the instruction, 
it exists only in the use of the single word ''if" at line 
4 as the instruction appears at page 21 of appellant's 
brief. It was however fully adequate to convince the 
jury that since no medical testimony of the effect of 
alcohol on the body was before it, it could not proceed 
to consider evidence of the alcoholic content of body 
fluids. This instruction alone fully protected appel-
lant's rights and no others were needed. We do not 
believe that the instruction is error. If it is, however, 
it was self-induced by appellant and he can take no 
comfort from his mistake. 
Appellant now urges "palpable" error and asks 
that on the strength of State v. Coho, 90 Utah 89, 
60 P. 2d 952, the Court disregard the long established 
rule of this jurisdiction that errors regarding instruc-
tions will not be considered on appeal unless exceptions 
are taken at trial. 
The Coho doctrine, however, is to be invoked 
only in capital cases and in cases of grave and serious 
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offenses carrying long terms of imprisonment; (See 
page 958 and only where proper determination of the 
issues would otherwise be denied). State v. Peterson, 
121 Utah 229, 240 P. 2d 504. 
This, of course, is not such a case in either sense. 
It is not a capital case nor is it grave or serious in com-
parison with other felonies in this jurisdiction, the sen-
tence being only for a period of from one to ten years, 
nor was appellant denied a fair trial by virtue of the 
instructions given. 
Appellant comes to a strange conclusion in seem-
ingly urging error in the Court's failure to give an in-
struction advising the jury of certain presumptions 
dealing with intoxication according to amounts of al-
cohol in the blood. These presumptions are given only 
in Section 41-6-44, U. C. A. 1953, 1959 Supp. (A. 
B. 22), and do not deal with the crime charged, except 
perhaps by analogy. There was no occasion for an 
instruction dealing with these presumptions. They 
relate to the crime of driving while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor or drug-a completely different 
charge than that here, automobile homicide. 
Appellant expresses a fanciful theory at page 23 
of his brief, in urging that, had the presumptions been 
outlined for the Court, his chances for acquittal would 
have been improved. Not only were the presumptions 
not relevant to the crime charged at all, but in addition, 
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he indulges in mindreading and speculation in guessing 
at the jury's conclusion. 
Appellant is mistaken in saying there was palpa-
ble error, and expects entirely too much under all the 
circumstances, in urging reversal for failure to give an 
instruction not asked for, especially when Instruction 
9 fully protects him. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT~S CONVICTION IN N 0 
WAY VIOLATED EITHER THE UNITED 
STATES OR STATE CONSTITUTION. 
Appellant interprets the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Sections 7 and 
12 of }\rticle I of the Constitution of Utah as prohi-
bitions against compelling a defendant to give evidence 
against himself, which, as an abstract proposition, may 
be true. 
Respondent is unable, however, to find from a 
careful search of the transcript any exercise of compul-
sion whatsoever at any stage of the case, beginning at 
the time of the accident. In the total absence of any 
evidence that defendant was compelled to give evidnce 
Jgainst himslf, it is unnecessary to go into the constitu-
tional question. 
Appellant complains that the record does not 
show evidence of any statement made to him by the 
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Justice of the Peace as to his constitutional right to 
remain silent. Occasionally, of course, records do not 
reflect everything which occurs in lower courts; nor 
is it common for testimony given in District Court 
trials to bring out everything which happened before 
the Justice of the Peace. Moreover, courts on appeal 
will presume, in the absence of a clear showing to the 
contrary, that proceedings prior to trial were in all 
respects regular. 
Appellant has completely failed to bring forth 
any evidence to substantiate his inference (A. B. 24), 
and in the absence of such evidence, it must be pre-
sumed that the Justice acted properly and that he ap-
prised defendant of his legal rights. It cannot be pre-
sumed to the contrary. If appellant had offered any 
evidence at all to back up his allegation, the state could 
have been expected to meet it. But there was no occa-
sion for doing so. See State v. Cano, 64 Utah 87, 228 
Pac. 563. 
Even assuming that the Justice's questioning of 
appellant was somewhat unusual under the circum-
stances, still it was not prejudicial to him in light of 
the abundance of other evidence sufficient in and of 
itself to prove his guilt, and in light of his total failure 
to take the legal procedural steps available to him at 
the trial. 
Mr. Arbuckle had no official role in the trial 
of the crime charged, except to serve as a witness (R. 
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1). He had only issued a commitment on a charge 
that was dropped, and did nothing at all as to the pre-
liminary hearing or anything else connected with the 
charge of automobile homicide. As to appellant's 
statement (A. B. 25) that the magistrate must tell a 
defendant the charges against him, (and we believe 
that Mr. Arbuckle did his duty) there can be no preju-
dice here even if he did not since Mr. Arbuckle testi-
fied (T. 180) that during the informal proceeding 
before him the arresting officer, in the presence of ap-
pellant, said he had charged him with "drunken driv-
. '' tng . 
The alleged error really relates to the matter of 
admissibility of appellant's admissions to the Justice 
of the Peace and not to the question of being compelled 
to testify against himself. Neither he nor counsel raised 
any objection whatsoever to the introduction of the 
testimony of Mr. Arbuckle as to the admissions made 
by appellant. In failing to do so, appellant waived any 
right to raise the matter on appeal. 
It is important to note, in addition, that even if 
error occurred in the act of the Justice of the Peace 
eliciting from appellant statements as to his drinking, 
such evidence resulted in no prejudice to him inasmuch 
as he himself testified at some length upon trial ( T. 
219-2 2 0) as to the facts of his drinking, thus making 
his objections moot under the circumstances. 
In claiming prejudicial error appellant relies to a 
great extent on the case of State v. Assenberg, 66 Utah 
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573, 244 Pac. 1027. That case, however, is readily 
distinguished from this one in several particulars. 
There, the defendant was a juvenile, age 19, without 
knowledge of his legal rights, who had been held in 
jail for nearly four days. Here the defendant was a 
mature man, a truck driver presumably cognizant of 
driving laws and the probable consequences to him of 
death or injury caused by driving negligently and un-
der influence of alcohol, a man who had not been held 
in jail at all prior to going before the Justice of the 
Peace. He merely had freely assented to go with the 
officers to the hospital and then voluntarily accom-
panied them to the residence of the Justice of the Peace. 
No coercion of any kind was exercised upon him at 
any time. 
Appellant urges error in the circumstances sur-
rounding his visit with the officers to St. Mark's Hos-
pital and their suggestions that he might desire to sub-
mit to a blood test. 
The fact that he refused repeatedly to take a 
blood test is, in and of itself, clear proof that he was 
not coerced into giving evidence against himself. He 
refused and that was all there was to it. No brutal 
methods were used and in fact no force, violence or 
threats were brought to bear. Since he did not take 
the test, everything complained of by appellant at page 
27 of his brief is pointless and moot. The Ringwood 
case (A. B. 27) is completely aside from the point. As 
to the urine test, appellant took it voluntarily. 
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For the record, however, it should be noted at T. 
85 that Mr. Haddenham testified that Trooper 
Schmidt informed Defendant that the blood test could 
be used for him or against him, and that it would 
either free him or convict him. 
It is not entirely clear how much or which phases 
of the questioning of appellant counsel now objects to 
as error. At page 24 of his brief, he seems to cast some 
doubt upon the right of peace officers to interrogate 
a defendant prior to his being taken before a magis-
trate. This, of course, is not a valid argument, as is 
shown by the holding of this Court in State v. Braasch, 
119 Utah 450, 229 P. 2d 289, where a defendant gave 
a complete statement at his first interview with the 
peace officers. 
Since it is clear that neither the Justice of the 
Peace nor any peace officers concerned exercised any 
coercion whatsoever upon appellant, his third point is 
to no avail. 
CONCLUSION 
Inasmuch as the court below committed no prej-
udicial error, and in light of the statutes and cases cited, 
respondent urges that this appeal be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
